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The governance of finance comprises a set of mechanisms aimed at directing the 
collective behavior of market participants – intermediaries, regulators, investors 
and consumers – and comprises the governance regime for the financial system. 
These mechanisms can take different forms, including ownership, law, or 
personal ties based on kinship, common origin, or association with a common 
cause. Most governance regimes combine several such mechanisms, but their 
relative importance differs from country to country. This paper explores the 
governance of finance in the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC). It argues that 
important legal, regulatory, and ownership changes over the past decade 
notwithstanding, the dominant form of governance in China is a network of 
financial cadres that is directed and supervised by the Communist Party (CCP). 
Far from being a leftover of the Maoist period, this nomenklatura regime was 
strengthened over the past decade in response to perceived threats to the 
stability of China’s financial -- and by implication, political -- system: The East 
Asian Financial Crisis; China’s membership in the WTO with its implied loss of 
control over formal entry barriers; and the global financial crisis. It is therefore 
unlikely to simply fade away as China becomes more integrated into the global 
financial system. The apparent compatibility of this system with China’s rise to 
prominence in global finance raises important questions about the future 
governance of the global financial system.  
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I.  Introduction  
 
 
This paper discusses the governance of China’s finances. It starts from two 
basic premises: First, that governance of finance can take multiple forms; and 
second, that the adoption of governance techniques that are common elsewhere 
does not necessarily imply that they will replace alternative modes of 
governance already in existence or designed to complement such techniques. 
Instead, adopting widely accepted governance techniques may serve to signal 
compliance but disguise the real allocation of control rights and their usage. 
Distinguishing between real and nominal governance requires closer inspection 
of governance regimes that transcends formal check lists, and instead probes 
more deeply into the configuration of power and influence and the channels 
through which such power is exercised.  
This contribution suggests that China has largely mimicked formal 
governance regimes common in Western market economies. However, this 
regime remains largely incomplete as control rights that flow from equity 
positions are partitioned among different stakeholders. The paper therefore 
explores an alternate mode of governing finance, namely human resource 
management (HRM), which uses control rights over the career path of top-level 
financial cadres. The importance of HRM for governing China’s economy, 
including its financial system is well understood within China. Outsiders, 
however, are more focused on governance structures that resemble those they   3
are familiar with. These are therefore the primary addressees of this contribution. 
To document the extent of HRM in China’s system of financial governance, the 
paper makes use of a newly created data base of current and previous top-level 
administrators and board members in key financial organizations to suggest that 
their career path through China’s financial system is far from random; instead, 
financial cadres tend to be extensively groomed at different financial 
organizations within the state apparatus before they were appointed to financial 
intermediaries with greater formal autonomy, such as commercial banks. Based 
on secondary sources the paper asserts that HRM is conducted by China’s 
Communist Party and that its reach and sophistication has increased rather than 
decreased over time. Indeed, one could argue that HRM has become a substitute 
to direct state control, which was still pervasive in China until the end of the 
1990s, and a complement to the new rule-based formal mechanisms of control. 
The CCP’s control over HR management intensified as the state apparatus 
loosened its direct control over the financial system, separated out different 
regulatory functions from the central bank’s unitary system of control, and sold 
important stakes in formerly state owned banks to non-state, including foreign, 
investors. HRM appears to work effectively for China’s domestic system as a 
means for maintaining control over and stabilizing the financial system. Yet, it 
remains to be seen how effective it can be employed for governing China’s 
exposure to global finance.    4
The paper is organized as follows. Part II describes the formal changes in 
China’s financial system over the past decade and asks whether the system of 
controls thus established has given rise to a coherent governance regime. Part III 
describes an alternate governance regime, one that relies less on formal 
mechanisms of control and instead uses controls over the careers of individuals 
who serve in the financial system, both in government agencies and in prominent 
financial intermediaries. It uses secondary sources to sketch the evolution of this 
system over the same period during which China introduced legal and 
regulatory means of governance. This evidence suggests that it would be wrong 
to assume that the withering away of direct state control of China’s finances has 
set the country on a path towards convergence with standard formal governance 
regimes found in the West. Against this background Part IV presents data on 
patterns of China’s human resource allocation within China’s financial system. 
The data comprise of information on 156 persons who occupy positions as top 
administrators at regulatory agencies, including China’s central bank, as well as 
positions on the management or supervisory boards of major financial 
intermediaries.  The paper employs simple network analysis to show that most 
of these office holders either occupy important positions at other financial 
organizations concurrently or have held such positions prior to their current one. 
The pattern of affiliation that emerges from these personal ties differs from the 
pattern of hierarchical control rights that follows from the formal lines of 
authority. Network analysis reveals the centrality of organizations and   5
individuals within China’s HRM governance regime.  However, our data also 
suggest that the number of people occupying management or supervisory board 
seats at major financial intermediaries relative to non-affiliate board members is 
declining at intermediaries with more diversified ownership structures and 
greater exposure to global markets.  This raises the question whether China will 
be able to rely on HRM as a key component for governing its financial system as 
more entities diversify globally -- a topic that will be discussed in Part V of the 
paper. Part VI places China’s governance of finance in comparative perspective 
by drawing parallels, but also distinctions, to France and Japan.  Part VII 
concludes with some normative considerations about this particular regime of 
financial governance.  
 
II.  The Formalization of China’s Financial System 
 
 
China has been widely criticized for postponing reforms of its financial sector 
until well into the late 1990s – with some observers arguing that this failure 
might derail the success of China’s economic reform project (Nicholas R. Lardy, 
2002). However, over the past decade Chinas has made major strides in 
overhauling its financial system. Today the financial sector’s formal governance 
regime resembles in many aspects that found in developed Western market 
economies and can be described in conventional functional terms as follows: The 
Peoples’ Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank is charged with monetary   6
and exchange rate policies. Several new regulatory agencies were established, 
such as the China’s Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which exercises 
oversight over China’s banking sector; the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), which overseas stock exchanges and regulates the issuance 
and trading of securities on these changes; and the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC), which overseas the insurance sector. Formally, the PBOC 
and the three major regulators are subordinate to the State Council, the country’s 
executive with the top officers at each of these entities having vice ministerial 
status in China’s bureaucratic hierarchy. As elsewhere, a single bank can 
simultaneously be subject to oversight by more than one regulatory agency: the 
PBOC window guidance policy; the CBRC for prudential supervision; and the 
CSRC’s enforcement of securities regulations. China instituted these changes 
before the problems of a functional division of labor among different financial 
regulators became apparent in the context of the global crisis.3 Notably, China 
had an intensive debate about whether carving out functional regulators from 
the unitary structure the PBOC was the right way to go4 before CBRC was 
established in 2003, or whether it would be preferable to retain consolidated 
oversight and control over the financial system. In fact, PBOC has continued to 
be involved in key areas of banking supervision, not the least the preparation of 
                                                 
3 For an overview of this debates and related reforms in the UK, but not the US, see Schooner, 
Heidi Mandanis and Taylor, Michael. "United Kingdom and United States Responses to the 
Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets." Texas International Law Journal, 2003, 38, pp. 
317. 
4 See http://business.sohu.com/20090106/n261587587.shtml (in Chinese).   7
BOC, CCB, and ICBC for their initial public offerings in 2005 and 2006 (ACFB, 
2007) – and presumably in other strategic decision as well.  
China has also begun an ownership transformation of the largest banks in the 
country, including three of the “big four” (ABC, BOC, CCB and ICBC) as well as 
of other banks, such as the Bank of Communications (BComm), and China 
Development Bank (CDB). Cumulatively these banks control about 70 percent of 
China’s bank assets (ACFB, 2007). However, none of these banks have been fully 
transferred to private ownership. Table 1 below details the stakes held by the 5 
largest owners of those banks that are publicly traded and for which, therefore, 
ownership data are publicly available. Consistent with the capital structure of 
these banks equity stakes are designated as A or H shares indicating whether 
they are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (H shares) or on one of the 
major domestic exchanges (A shares).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
As can be seen, government ownership is fairly centralized in the hands of 
Central Hui Jin Investment Ltd. (hereinafter Hui Jin) and the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) as the largest blockholders. Hui Jin and MoF are by no means the only 
state entities with substantial ownership stakes. Others include the National 
Council of the Social Social Security Fund (NCSSF), which holds as much as 15.3   8
percent in H shares in ICBC. Moreover, several state owned enterprises hold 
sizeable stakes in these companies.5  
The role of more than one state or state-controlled entities as the dominant 
owner of China’s banks is noteworthy, because their co-existence obfuscates the 
state’s use of ownership as a means of controlling them. For wholly state owned 
enterprises in the non-financial sector the new Law on State Owned Assets (SOA 
Law)6 resolves the potential conflict among several state controlled entities in the 
exercise of ownership rights, such as the election of management and 
supervisory board members by delegating this task to a single agent: the State-
owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). However, 
this law does not apply to financial companies. Instead, for the financial sector 
China has invented a new version of the famous separation of ownership and 
control first described by Berle and Means (Adolf Augustus Berle and Gardiner 
Means, 1932), namely the separation of the right to appoint the officers and 
board members of financial intermediaries from the economic costs and benefits 
associated with holding shares in such entities.  
For purposes of illustration, take the example of Hui Jin, which next to the 
Ministry of Finance is the most important shareholder of China’s dominant 
banks. Hui Jin was established in 2003 as a subsidiary of the State Administration 
                                                 
5 HKSCC does not represent another blockholder; the acronym stands for the Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company, which serves as a street name for other investors, each of which is 
likely to hold a much smaller stake than the combined share-holding of HKSCC indicated in the 
table.  
6 The law was promulgated by the National People’s Congress on October 28, 2008 and became 
effective on 1 May 2009.   9
for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which in turn is an administrative agency 
subordinate to the PBOC. Hui Jin was authorized by the State Council – i.e. by 
China’s executive -- to make “equity investments in major state-owned financial 
enterprises, and […], to the extent of its capital contribution, [to] exercise the 
rights and perform the obligations as an investor on behalf of the State in 
accordance with applicable laws”.7 In 2007, Hui Jin, which is organized as a 
limited liability company, became a wholly owned subsidiary of CIC, China’s 
newly established sovereign wealth fund. To this end, MoF issued special 
treasury bonds that were used to acquire Hui Jin from PBOC; subsequently Hui 
Jin was transferred to CIC for a price of US$ 70 bln, i.e. almost one third of CIC’s 
initial capital of US$200 bln (Michael Martin, 2008). As the parent and sole 
shareholder of Hui Jin one would expect CIC to control the appointment of Hui 
Jin’s management and supervisory board members. This, however, is not the 
case. Instead, Hui Jin’s charter stipulates that the State Council exercises these 
rights8 -- irrespective of the fact that the State Council never held any shares in 
Hui Jin and CIC is now its parent.  
This separation of control rights from ownership suggests that ownership is 
not conclusive in determining who actually exercises control rights over a state 
owned entity. Indeed, even the contents of Hui Jin’s charter is misleading in this 
regard, because ultimately the CCP appoints top officials to financial entities – 
                                                 
7 See the statement on Hui Jin’s web page available at www.huijin-inv.cn.  
8 See excerpts from Hui Jin’s articles of incorporation available at its web site at 
http://www.huijin-inv.cn/hjen/governance/governance_2008.html?var1=Governance (last 
visited 24 August 2009).    10
including regulators, wholly and partially state owned entities. The CCP’s 
powers are not mentioned in Hui Jin’s or any of the banks’ charters; however 
neither would it be appropriate to relegate them to  ‘informal’ means of control.9 
Within China the CCP continues to be recognized as an integral part of a 
dualistic power structure with the state apparatus and the CCP form two 
separate yet inter-linked hierarchies that use different mechanisms of control 
(Barry Naughton, 2008). Whereas the state is associated with control rights 
exercised by way of ownership and administrative lines of control, the CCP 
controls the career paths of individuals in the party, the state, and in 
organizations that are critical to the Party or the state (Yasheng Huang, 1996, 
Victor C. Shih, 2008).  
 
III.  China’s Other Governance Regime: The CCP’s Human Resource 
Management (HRM)  
 
A critical component of financial governance in China is the CCP’s 
management of human resource. The CCP controls key positions in government, 
administration, and government controlled sectors in the economy. This function 
                                                 
9 A tradition has evolved in the new institutional economics literature to distinguish between 
formal and informal institutions depending on whether they are promulgated by the state, or not. 
See North, Douglass Cecil. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. This distinction, however, can be 
misleading when applied to countries, such as China with more complex power relations. For a 
critique of the formal-informality divide see Pistor, Katharina. "Comment: The Law and the Non-
Law." University of Michigan International Law Journal, 2006.   11
has evolved over time and has been exercised via different channels. Critically, 
and perhaps counter-intuitively given China’s economic rise and embrace of 
market mechanisms in many aspects of economic organization, it has not 
diminished in recent time. Indeed, the CCP’s power of the financial sector by 
way of HRM seems to have increased arguably as a way of ensuring continued 
control over finance given its central role to economic, social and political 
stability.  
The role of the CCP in controlling key personnel is well established; in an 
attempt to bolster its legitimacy in China’s evolving governance structure the 
CCP has made some its operations more transparent and has promulgated a set 
of “Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government 
Leading Cadres” (Zhiyue Bo, 2004, John P. Burns, 1994). These regulations are 
not published, but are widely circulated among administrators and managers in 
government and in practice they operate as binding rules.  Neither the corporate 
law nor the charters of the major banks refer to these rules. Nonetheless, the CCP 
rules explicitly state that the CCP selects and appoints the Chairman, Vice- 
Chairmen, President and Vice-Presidents of the Bank of China and the 
equivalent positions at the other banks, as well as top management at CIC, 
China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund (established in 2007). 
In order to understand the importance of CCP’s HRM as a means of 
governing China’s finance it is useful to analyze how the CCP’s governance of 
human resources has co-evolved with the formal changes in China’s financial   12
system described above. At the end of 1998 the basic governance structure of 
China’s finances had not changed much from 1980 (Victor C. Shih, 2008). 
Consistent with the co-existence of state and party structures linked by the 
general oversight of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, state and party 
governance formed two partly overlapping vertical governance regimes: The 
State Council formally controlled the PBOC, which in turn controlled the four 
state banks; they in turn oversaw their own. There were no specialized regulators 
so that the PBOC acted as lender, regulator and de facto owner in one. Parallel to 
this structure, the CCP imposed its own control mechanism in the form of 
Central Discipline and Inspection Commission  (CDIC), which was subordinate 
to the Central Committee. It gained control over staffing the members of the 
disciplinary party committees found at each of the state owned banks; local Party 
committees exercised similar powers over local branches of the major banks. In 
addition to disciplinary supervision, the CCP appointed the PBOCs’ key 
management personnel and the PBOC in turn appointed the leadership at the 
major banks (Victor C. Shih, 2008).  
This structure optimized centralized control of the CCP but did not easily 
accommodate a more differentiated division of labor among various functional 
regulators (such as the CBRC), which were established in China over the past 
decade; nor could it easily fit an ownership structure that included non-state 
owners including foreign investors. The latter was deemed important for China 
to comply with the opening of financial services under the GATS agreement, but   13
also to impose greater financial discipline on the banks and expose them to 
foreign expertise (Franklin Allen, 2005, Lamin Leigh and Richard Podpiera, 
2006). 
The East Asian financial crisis served as a wake-up call to those concerned 
with the governance of finance around the world, including politicians and party 
leaders in China. China was not directly affected by the crisis, because it had 
insulated itself from global markets by capital controls, tight exchange rate 
management and a state controlled financial system. Nonetheless, leaders in 
China quickly recognized the risk of financial de-stabilization to the Chinese 
economy and by implication, to the stability of the political regime,10 and sought 
to address these concerns at the same time as they were embarking on reforming 
the financial system, which had seriously lagged behind institutional and 
governance reforms (Nicholas R. Lardy, 2002).  
In response to these challenges, the CCP began to tighten its control over the 
financial sector (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). The vehicle for this strategy was the 
Central Financial Work Commission (CFWC), a newly established body that was 
directly and exclusively answerable to the CCP’s Central Committee. Wen 
Jiabao, vice premier and Politburo member, served as its chairman. The changes 
implied that the CCP gained direct control over appointing and dismissing key 
personnel at China’s four largest banks – powers, which previously had been 
                                                 
10 The intimate connection between financial, economic and political stability was forcefully 
demonstrated by the case of Indonesia during the East Asian financial crisis. It let to riots and 
brought down an autocratic regime under President Suharto.    14
vested with the PBOC. Now, key personnel was nominated by the banks and 
approved by the CFWC (Victor C. Shih, 2008). In the words of Heilmann who 
conducted numerous interviews in China to establish the role of the CFWC: 
“After the establishment of the CFWC, the appointment procedures and authority 
relationships changed fundamentally. Thereafter, the CFWC, in cooperation with the financial 
institution and state regulatory body concerned, actively investigated, appraised and appointed 
financial cadres who were deemed loyal to the Party centre and professionally qualified to take 
leading positions. The headquarters of financial institutions still recommended persons to 
become senior managers. But they now had to submit and justify their choice to the CFWC for 
approval. The final decision rested with the CFWC (…) Moreover, the CFWC installed vertical 
leadership authority by newly established full Party committees between the national and 
subnational management levels.” (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). 
 
These powers did not make the CFWC a hands-on manager; its own rules 
prohibited it from taking up such a role. However, by appointing all members of 
the newly created supervisory boards of banks and other financial intermediaries 
that were corporatized at the time, the CFWC was able to place 200 members it 
had selected on 16 newly established supervisory boards in 2000 alone (ibid at 
12). 
The CFWC’s control over human resources extended also to key regulators. 
Between 1998 and 2003 the CFWC controlled the appointment of senior 
executives across all key institutions in finance, including regulators, 
administrative agencies and banks (see Table [2] below). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
   15
CFWC was disbanded in 2003 and its more regulatory functions were 
transferred to the newly created bank regulator, the CBRC – formally a spin-off 
from PBOC. However, its operation has left a decisive mark on the management 
of China’s financial sector. First, CFWC was deeply involved in the establishment 
and staffing of CBRC and the new banking supervision law prepared was 
prepared by it (Sebastian Heilmann, 2005). Indeed, of the CBRC’s 16 new 
departments within CBRC, only five were transferred from the PBOC, while 
eleven had previously been housed inside the CFWC (ibid). Similarly, the newly 
appointed top officials at CBRC had all previously been members of CFWC. 
More generally, the formal dissolution of CFWC – or perhaps rather its 
transformation into a regulatory body -- did not put an end to Party control over 
HRM in China’s financial sector. Instead, CFWC’s HRM functions were 
transferred to the CCP Central Organization Department (COD) – much to the 
critique of China’s financial press.11 The COD now exercises the power to 
appoint senior executives at China’s national state supervisory organs (PBOC, 
CBRC, CSRC, CIRC) and ten national financial companies under central 
administration, including the big 4 national commercial banks, the three policy 
banks, Bank of Communications, Everbright Group and CITIC Group (Sebastian 
Heilmann, 2005), and more recently CIC. Appointment powers for top cadres at 
the PBOC and the three functional regulators were delegated to CCP Committees 
                                                 
11 Heilmann quotes Caijing, China’s leading financial paper as bemoaning the lack of profound 
reform reflected in this decision. See Ibid at p. 17 and footnote 59.   16
at these organizations. Moreover, the appointment of lower level appointees at 
these organizations’ regional branch offices were transferred to corresponding 
local Party committees (ibid at 18). Interestingly, the administrative heads of the 
three regulatory agencies no longer combine the roles of Party secretary and state 
or bureaucratic leader; instead a greater functional division was implemented, 
whereby the ‘Number 1’ at these agencies with the power to exercise overall 
strategic leadership is now appointed by a CCP committee, but does not operate 
simultaneously as the representative of the Party within the organization. 
Instead, this function is exercised by the “Number 2” with the mandate to 
conduct human resource management (Barry Naughton, 2008). Rather than 
indicating a diminished role of the CCP at these entities, it can also be viewed as 
a sign for the increasing importance attributed by the Party to HRM. 
The continuing pervasive role of the CCP in China’s financial system by way 
of controlling HRM should leave its marks on appointment patterns and 
promotions of key individuals. We will explore this in the following section, 
which introduces a new data set and brings to bear basic network analysis to 
explore the governance of China’s finances. 
 
IV.  Scale and Scope of the CCP’s HRM: Empirical Evidence 
 
This section presents empirical evidence on the scale and scope of the CCP’s 
management of human resources over China’s finances. To this end we have   17
collected data on the key positions in management and supervision at China’s 
major regulators and financial intermediaries. For each person who was 
identified as a current top-level administrator at a regulatory entity (PBOC, 
CBRC, CSRC etc.), or as a member of either the management board or the 
supervisory board of a financial intermediary (BOC, CCB, ICBC, ABC, etc), we 
recorded his (and occasionally her) concurrent position at other entities as well as 
positions that person has held previously. These data were hand collected using 
information made available on the web sites and annual reports of the 
organizations in question.12  The database includes 155 people and a total 41 
entities or organizations with which they are or have been affiliated. Initially, we 
included 13 entities in the analysis: PBOC, SAFE, CBRC, CSRC, CIC, Hui Jin, 
BOC, CCB, ICBC, ABC, Import Export Bank (IEB), BComm, and Chinas 
Development Bank (CDB). We coded all top-level executives and board members 
at these entities and traced their current and previous ties to other entities 
throughout China’s financial system. Indeed, we also included other important 
government positions, such as governor or vice governor of a province. 
However, we did not include in our data set previous postings at multilateral 
institutions, such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank.  
We use this database to establish the imprint of HRM on the governance of 
China’s finances. As posited earlier, HRM can be regarded as an alternative 
                                                 
12 The full data base names and affiliations, including explanations for the role of different 
organizations is on file with the author.    18
governance regime to the formal control structure that China has established 
over the past decade. In order to establish the relation between formal control 
structures rooted in legally and administratively established lines of authority on 
one hand, and the scope of HRM within China’s financial system on the other, 
we compare the governance structures of these two alternative regimes. Figure 1 
depicts the governance regime that emerges from the analysis of formal lines of 
control, i.e. ownership relations and lines of administrative or regulatory 
authority. It includes the largest owners of the banks listed in Table 1 above 
(except for HKSCC) as well as regulatory and supervisory authorities embedded 
in China’s legal infrastructure. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The picture that emerges is a bi-furcated governance structure headed by the 
Sate Council and divided into monetary and exchange rate policy represented by 
PBOC and SAFE on one hand (at the far right side of the figure) and financial 
intermediation, represented by banks and their regulators on the other. The 
central role of Hui Jin as a major owner in China’s “big 4” is readily apparent. 
Contrast this picture with the one found in Figure 2 below, which depicts the 
relations among the same entities, but this time the ties among entities are not 
determined by ownership or administrative lines of authority; instead, they   19
depict interlocking positions held by senior executives or board members at two 
or more entities. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Unlike the first picture, the PBOC now takes a much more central role as a 
result of its many interlocking senior positions with the CCP Committees,13 
SAFE, CBRC and CSRC as well as CIC. Hui Jin remains a central player, but less 
because of its ties to major banks – although it does have concurrent board seats 
at CCB – but instead, because members of its boards concurrently hold positions 
within the NPC, the Accounting Society of China as well as CIC and indirectly 
(via an interlocking board members at CCB) with China’s International Economic 
Arbitration Commission.  
In order to formally establish the relative importance of these various 
entities in the web of financial relations, we calculate the centrality of these 
different organizations based on Betweenness. It measures the relation of a given 
actor to other actors in the system by calculating its position relative to other 
pairs of actors. The idea is that an actor that links multiple pairs of related actors 
confers power on that actor. The coefficient for Betweenness increases with the 
number of geodesic paths to which it is linked; i.e. in our case the coefficient 
                                                 
13 Note that all top level officials at PBOC concurrently serve on PBOC’s CCP Commission. In 
other words, the division of labor between strategic and human resource management described 
above is absent at the PBOC.   20
increases as a single entity is linked with each additional pair of organizations. 
According to this measure, CIC occupies the position of highest centrality for 
concurrent interlocking positions followed by the CCP.14  
Figure 3 depicts the same affiliations, but this time we have included not 
only concurrent positions, but also the positions senior executives or board 
members had previously held at other entities within China’s financial sector. 
The number of entities has increased and so has the complexity of the network. 
Visually it is apparent that CIC, Hui Jin, the CCP as well as the PBOC occupy 
central positions within this network; in other words, each of them is linked to 
many other institutions by way of positions held by their top level financial 
cadres either concurrently or sequentially. However, the numerical analysis 
reveals that three of the “big 4” banks outperform CIC and PBOC on the 
centrality measure of Betweenness15 -- even though CIC, the CCP as well as the 
PBOC are close followers on this measure and outrank other state entities.16 This 
suggests that they are more deeply embedded in the HRM governance regime as 
a result of previous appointments executive and supervisory board members at 
these entities have held than is apparent from analyzing only the current 
interlocking positions they occupy.  It is also worth noting that whereas ICBC 
and IEB lack ties with other organizations in the financial system by way of 
current interlocking positions, many of their board members previously 
                                                 
14 The coefficient for CIC is 0.389 and for the CCP 0.283 
15 The coefficients for BOC, CCB and ICBC are respectively 0.192, 0.252, and 0.244  
16 CIC 0.181, CCP 0.149 and PBOC 0.155.   21
occupied such positions. Again, this suggests that they may in fact be less 
autonomous than their concurrent affiliations indicate. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Network analysis allows us not only to identify the centrality of different 
organizations in China’s financial system, but also the centrality of individuals. 
The more positions a person occupies in a system, and the more other 
individuals are tied to it by holding positions at entities with which that 
individual is affiliated, the more powerful such person. Figure 4 below reveals 
the relation among the 155 individuals in our database via organizations with 
which they are currently affiliated. The picture clearly insulates the people 
currently holding positions at ICBC and IEB from the rest of the financial cadres 
who maintain many ties with multiple entities throughout financial system by 
way of concurrent affiliation.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The measure we use to assert their centrality in this case is the Degree of 
centrality, which measures how many ties a given node (here a financial cadre). 
In contrast to the Betweenness measure used above measuring centrality by Degree 
is less concerned with how many dependency relations that individual   22
intercepts. On this measure, three individuals, all affiliated with CIC, score the 
highest: Lou Jiwei, the Chairman of CIC, Jin Liqun, the chairman of Hui Jin who 
also serves on CIC’s board, and Cui Guangqin also a concurrent board member 
of CIC and Hui Jin.17 While perhaps not all personal ties should be given equal 
weight, because they not necessarily confer the same level of influence in the 
governance of CIC, it is still remarkable how closely CIC is intertwined with 
other entities in China’s financial system.  
In practice, CIC portrays itself as an autonomous actor – an ordinary financial 
intermediary whose task it is to maximize financial returns on its assets without 
a political agenda or much explicit political interference. Yet, CIC has on its 
supervisory board representatives from virtually every important government 
entity within China’s financial system and its executives previously served on 
important posts in other financial entities – including the PBOC, the MoF, and 
the CSRC.  
Based on this analysis it seems fair to say that the 155 cadres currently 
occupying key positions in finance form a thick network, which links important 
entities and which comprises the core of China’s governance regime for finance. 
The most striking result of this analysis is the contrast between the dense 
network relations depicted in Figures 2 through 4 with the simple control 
structure in Figure 1. While it may be too strong to suggest that personal ties 
                                                 
17 All three share the same score of 7.723. Note that for the purpose of this analysis we have 
excluded individuals that are only linked to ICBC or IEB as their score indicates relations to a 
much smaller network.   23
substitute for formal control based on ownership ties, the former appear to 
dominate the latter. This is nowhere more apparent than in the role of the PBOC. 
Judging from the formal lines of control alone PBOC occupies a rather marginal 
place in China’s financial system (see Figure 1 above). However, based on the 
personal ties revealed in Figures 2 and 3, there is little doubt that PBOC, or rather 
the financial cadres serving at PBOC are central players within China’s system of 
finance. Moreover, as in the early days of China’s transition to a market 
economy, PBOC continues to operate as the link between state and Party control 
over China’s financial sector. All of its leading cadres concurrently hold positions 
at PBOC’s party committee and as such exercise HRM controls over key 
regulators within the system. 
Yet, our data also indicate that this system is not without vulnerabilities. As 
indicated in Figures 2 and 4, some entities lack current interlocking ties with 
other organizations – most notably ICBC and IEB. ICBC is particularly 
interesting, as it is traded on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges and 
calls not only private investors, but also major foreign investors, such as 
Goldman Sachs, among its owners. This raises the question whether HRM as a 
governance regime can adapt China’s increasing role in global finance.  
 
V.  China’s Global Ambitions and the Future of HRM 
   24
The transformation of China’s financial sector over the past ten years has 
gone hand in hand with its rapid expansion and its integration into the global 
financial system. BOC, CCB, and ICBC, as well as Bank of Communications 
(BComm) were listed on Hong Kong’s stock exchange and sold shares to foreign 
investors, including important strategic investors as early as 2005 and 2007 
(Katharina Pistor, 2010). ABC followed suit in mid 2010.18 While some of these 
foreign investors have shed or reduced their holdings in Chinese banks, mostly 
because they needed to raise fresh capital during the global financial crisis 
(Katharina Pistor, 2009a), the bank’s exposure to foreign investors has given 
them an opportunity to learn from other business models and adapt them to 
China’s circumstances. Representatives of foreign banks served on the boards of 
China’s commercial banks -- albeit not in executive positions, giving them access 
to information on how the Chinese system of finance operates in practice, but 
also exposing other board members to the views of representatives of foreign 
financial intermediaries. 
China’s major banks have also become more active globally themselves. BOC, 
which was carved out from the PBOC in 1984 took over the central bank’s 
foreign currency portfolio at the time and has established branches and 
                                                 
18 “Agricultural Revolution – Agricultural Bank’s IP”, The Economist, 10 July 2010, p. 69. Note 
that the key strategic investors for ABC were not private financial intermediaries from the West 
as in the case of the first three banks that went public, but instead SWFs from the Gulf states 
(ibid). This reflects the changing landscape of global finance. See Pistor (2009a) on the role of 
SWFs in the global financial system.    25
subsidiaries around the globe.19 CCB and ICBC have followed suit more recently 
and expanded their global operations. ICBC has moved beyond opening 
representative or branch offices and has recently acquired a twenty percent stake 
in South Africa’s Standard bank in 2008. The two banks are now cooperating 
across the African Continent in numerous ventures related to mining and natural 
resource exploration.20 Last but not least, China established a new sovereign 
wealth fund in 2007. CIC has made several widely reported foreign investments, 
including in the US private equity firm Blackstone and the investment bank 
Morgan Stanley (Katharina Pistor, 2009a), and more recently in the natural 
resource sector.21 In addition to CIC, the State Administration for Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) and the National Security Fund are engaging in foreign 
investments. In contrast to CIC, which has taken substantial minority stakes, 
SAFE and NSF seem to be taking smaller stakes and maintain a more diversified 
portfolio that includes both equity and debt securities.22  
The involvement of foreign investors in China’s state controlled banks, the 
outwards expansion of financial intermediaries, as well as the greater openness 
of China’s financial system to foreign investments (including wholly owned 
                                                 
19 For details on BOC branches in different countries see http://www.BOC.cn/en/aboutBOC/. 
20 “ICBC cooperates with Standard Bank on 65 projects”, China Daily, 26 May 2009, available at 
http://en.ce.cn/Industries/Financial-services.  
21 For details on CIC’s recent investments see http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/cic.php.  
22 See http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/safe.php on SAFE. The National Council on Social 
Security Fund is only beginning to invest globally. See 
http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/nssf.php.    26
banks and other financial intermediaries) raises questions about the viability of 
the described HRM governance regime as a long term governance strategy.  
A similar question can and should be asked about any governance regime, 
including those based on conventional formal mechanisms, such as ownership 
and regulatory controls. National regulators have only limited reach over their 
own banks with global operations and have had at best limited success in 
controlling financial intermediaries operating on their shores. Nowhere has this 
been more apparent than in the recent global crisis. A good example is Iceland, 
which had allowed its bank Landsbanki to expand rapidly in foreign markets by 
using the inter-bank lending market for its liquidity needs and attracting foreign 
depositors with high interest rates in internet retail operations primarily in the 
UK and the Netherlands (Lord Adair Turner, 2009). When the inter-bank lending 
market froze Islandic bank collapsed and Iceland was unable to cover deposit 
insurance for depositors in the UK. Legally, Iceland was responsible for 
insurance as well as lender of last resort functions of Islandic bank, because the 
UK operations were technically branch operations of the parent bank and as such 
under the jurisdiction of Iceland.23 On the flip side, the UK had paid only scant 
attention to Islandic’s operations in the UK – after all, this was the responsibility 
of the Iceland’s regulators. When that bank collapsed and amidst fears of another 
                                                 
23 For Iceland this followed not only from the Basel Concordat, but also from relevant EU 
legislation, as Iceland is a member of the EEA and as such subject to EU regulations and 
directives, which follow the Basel model in dividing responsibilities between home and host 
country regulators and lenders of last resort.    27
bank run,24 the UK government stepped in to provide coverage and in return 
froze all asset of Iceland under an anti-terrorism law. Similarly, regulators in 
Austria, Sweden and other European countries witnessed their banking industry 
expand aggressively into Central and Eastern Europe. Again, these banking 
groups greatly contributed to a rapid credit expansion that proved 
unsustainable. Unlike the case of Icelandic Bank, the foreign operations usually 
took the form of wholly owned subsidiaries, which placed them under the 
jurisdiction of the host countries when it came to covering depositors and 
offering lender of last resort functions. Most of the CEE countries had tried to 
stem the flow of credit, but found this to be largely ineffective, because foreign 
parent banks quickly outmaneuvered them by switching to alternative channels 
for their continued credit expansion. As the result, most CEE saw themselves 
unable to rescue their own financial system and ended up seeking help from the 
IMF and other multilaterals (Katharina Pistor, 2009b). In short, neither the 
property rights regime of trans-nationally operating banking groups nor thirty 
years of international cooperation in developing common standards for banking 
supervision within the BIS framework and the EU (which largely incorporated 
the BIS framework) have shielded countries that rely on those governance 
mechanisms from the prospects of financial collapse.  
                                                 
24 The UK Bank Northern Rock failed in 2007 triggering the first bank run in the UK since 1866. 
See “The Run on the Rock” Report by the Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons, 24 
January 2008.   28
Similarly, both systems – the formal and the HRM governance regimes, have 
had their fair shares of rogue traders. For China, the wakeup call that HRM 
might be insufficient for governing personnel located abroad came with the 
collapse of China Aviation Oil Company (CAO) on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange in December of 2004.25 However, other governance regimes have 
experienced similar failures – one needs only to point to Barings or the more 
recent case of Société General.  
Raising concerns about the vulnerability of HRM in the context of 
globalization is therefore not meant to benchmark this particular regime against 
an allegedly superior standard, but to detect the specific strengths and 
weaknesses of this regime in the global context.26 China’s HRM regime as 
described above is built around the notion that there is a centralized vetting of 
cadres for the financial sector not only when they first enter the system, but also 
as they advance through the system. For every major position at the central bank, 
regulators, or financial intermediaries, the CCP or CCP committees at the PBOC 
or the CBRC vet and ultimately approve the relevant financial cadres. PBOC also 
maintains its own training school from which people are recruited for important 
positions within the system.27 As our data analysis suggests a substantial number 
of persons in this universe have held other positions in finance before being 
                                                 
25 This case is explored in detail in Milhaupt, Curtis J. and Pistor, Katharina. Law and Capitalism: 
What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2008., Chapter 7 at 125. 
26 This approach is explained in greater detail in Milhaupt and Pistor supra note 22. 
27 I am grateful to Professor Leonard K. Cheng at Hong Kong’s University for Science and 
Technology for pointing this out.    29
appointed to the one they hold currently; moreover, they typically maintain 
direct and indirect ties to other entities where they served before or hold 
concurrent positions. The question then is, whether this system can adapt to the 
global operation of Chinese banks and/or the increase in job opportunities in 
China’s expanding financial system, which includes an increasing number of 
entities that at least to our knowledge are not part of the CCP’s HRM system. 
In seeking answers to this question, this part of the paper examines 
affiliations of members of management and supervisory boards of only those 
financial intermediaries that have substantial global operations. The purpose of 
this exercise is to analyze how deeply these entities are embedded in China’s 
HRM system. This database includes 127 individuals at 18 entities. 24 of the 127 
individuals concurrently occupy another position within China’s financial 
system, while the remaining 103 do not. Of those that are currently without 
interlocking positions, 54 have held positions at other financial organizations 
prior to their current position and 39 held positions at state entities in finance, 
such as the PBOC, SAFE, the CBRC etc. The other 15 individuals occupied 
positions at another bank – typically at a time when these banks were still an 
integral part of a state controlled financial system. Still, this leaves 49 individuals 
without any current or previous affiliations – some of which other 
representatives of foreign investors, others ‘independent’ directors recruited, 
among others, from academic institutions in China.    30
As can be seen in Figure 5 below, the density of current affiliations varies. As 
already noted, ICBC and IEB have no current affiliations. However, the number 
of current affiliates at other commercial banks with global operations, including 
BOC and CCB is also strikingly low. In part this seems to be compensated by 
what one may want to call ‘strong’ ties within China’s HRM system. Thus, Xiao 
Gang, the CEO of BOC is head of the CCP Commission at BOC, and thus closely 
tied to the Party; but this is not the case for CCB’s CEO, Guo Shuqing. Guo’s 
future career may still be entire dependent on the CCP’s HRM system and that 
might suffice to ensure that his interests and the interests of the bank he heads 
are aligned with those of the China’s leaders. However, as CCB continues to 
expand globally, increasing tensions between global opportunities and concerns 
about China’s internal stability may arise and at least for an outside observer it is 
difficult to determine how such a conflict might be resolved. 
It may be too strong to assert that some banks with global operations are 
‘growing out’28 of the HRM used to govern China’s financial system. 
Nonetheless, the examples suggest that some entities have enjoyed greater 
leeway in recruiting from a pool of people with fewer ties to the broader network 
of China’s financial cadres. Within China, this is a new experiment. There is little 
doubt that underperformance of these individuals too would be sanctioned were 
they return to the state controlled financial system. However, today they may 
                                                 
28 This terminology is borrowed from Naughton’s book title Naughton, Barry. Growing out of the 
Plan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996. and the accompanying analysis, which 
suggests that China’s path to economic success has been a gradual transformation of economic 
relations.   31
well find job opportunities elsewhere. Nonetheless, as long as the flow of people 
the CCP can recruit into this system is sufficiently large, the fact that some will 
exit and find jobs in systems that maintain fewer controls over individuals may 
not lead to its demise. Of greater importance is the size of the financial system 
under the control of the CCP relative to those parts that escape its control. As 
mentioned the CCP controls key positions only at China’s largest banks. Today 
they still account for 70 percent of all bank assets (see supra). However, smaller 
banks are no longer directly controlled by the state and the opening of China’s 
financial system to new entrants, including greenfield establishments, may 
gradually change the financial landscape. Just as China’s real economy has 
“grown out of the plan” (Barry Naughton, 1996), so too may the financial system 
grow out of CCP tutelage. This process, however, is only beginning. If anything, 
the global financial crisis has strengthened those who believe that a liberalized 
financial system poses a threat to China’s economic success and its political 
foundations.  
 
VI.  HRM in Comparative Perspective 
 
China’s governance of finance may be unique with respect to the central role 
the CP plays in vetting cadres for key positions within the system. However, 
other countries too have a highly centralized elite structure that dominates the 
key echelons of power in politics, finance and big business. A comparison of   32
power elites in Britain and France reveals that in both countries elites are highly 
concentrated, but that the social processes by which elites are formed and the 
position they occupy on their path to power differ across systems (Mairi Maclean 
et al., 2010). Maclean et al. identify the top power wielders in both countries by 
focusing on corporate executive and non-executive directorships. They allocate 
weights to positions in corporate hierarchies these directors hold (whether CEO, 
chairman of the board, etc.) for a sample of over one thousand agents in each 
system. They find that in France, 200 directors wield 63 percent of the combined 
power of the entire sample; and in Britain 54 (ibid at p. 336). The formation of 
this elite occurs primarily in the education system, especially in France. 95 
percent of the top 100 directors in France attended a Parisien lycée (highschool) 
and virtually all attended one of France’s elite schools (grandes écoles) for higher 
education, such as the École Poytechnique, the Institut d’Études Politiques de 
Paris or the École Nationale d’Administration (ENA). Education at one of these 
institutions does not only open the path to top positions in state administration 
or politics, but also in the private sector. In Maclean’s sample, 49 of the top 100 
corporate directors in France began their career in government and advanced 
from there to one of the top positions in the private sector (ibid at 339). These 
findings are consistent with earlier findings that showed that a position at the 
French Treasury is a critical step in the career path of a future top level manager 
at one of France’s financial institutions (Charles Kadushin, 1995). The Treasury is 
one of the most powerful agencies in France’s political system and recruits the   33
top graduates from the grandes écoles (ibid at 210). Directorships and similar 
positions with the Treasury are term limited (five years). However, private sector 
financial institutions recruit their top corporate officers at the Treasury offering 
them a multiple of their salaries.  
The pattern of career advancement is thus not very different from China’s. As 
suggested in this paper, top corporate officers China’s largest banks typically 
served previously either at the PBoC or the Ministry of Finance at earlier stages 
in their career before advancing to their current position. Interestingly, this 
pattern of elite formation has not changed after France abandoned direct control 
over the corporate and financial sectors (Charles Kadushin, 1995). Existing 
literatures say little about whether this form of HRM has gained strength as the 
state has lost direct control over the corporate sector – a trend that is suggested 
by the CP’s strengthening of HRM since the late 1990s. At the very least, 
however, the experience of France confirms that state ownership is not needed 
for HRM, and that it survives changes of ownership as well as changes in 
government.  
The above discussion could lead to the conclusion that HRM is more common 
in countries with a high level state control over the economy, or in the language 
of the comparative capitalism literature in “coordinated market economies” in 
contrast to “liberal market economies” as represented by the UK or the US (Peter 
A. Hall and David Soskice, 2001). In fact, Yoo and Lee suggest that elite networks   34
are complementary to institutions of state dirigisme and associated low levels of 
social trust (Taeyoung Yoo and Soo Hee Lee, 2009).  
However, available evidence suggests that liberal market economies too are 
governed by elites. Thus, Maclean et al find that in Britain over 88 percent of the 
top corporate directors attended elite framer schools, such as Eton, Winchester or 
Harrow. While the level of higher education is much lower than in France, those 
with higher education tended to have gone to ‘Oxbridge’ or Harvard (Mairi 
Maclean, Charles Harvey and Robert Chia, 2010).  Moreover, 84 out of 100 
corporate directors began their career in the private corporate sector and the 
remainder in law or similar professions, but not in government service. In the US 
linkages between the corporate and government sectors appear to be more 
prevalent. The importance of power networks that criss-cross government and 
business in the US was first pointed to by Mills in 1956 (Wright Mills, 1956). 
Moreover, anecdotal evidence confirms that links between government and 
finance are strong, as suggested by the advancement of two former Goldman 
Sachs top managers to the position of US Treasury in two recent administrations: 
Paul Rubin in the Clinton, and Hank Paulson in the second George W. Bush 
administration. Indeed, a more systematic analysis of elite structures for the 
1990s reveals strong interlocks between the corporate, non-profit and state 
sectors in the United States (Gwen Moore et al., 2002). Using a newly created elite 
database they show that many corporate directors link to non-governmental 
organizations as well as to federal advisory bodies. Unlike China or France,   35
however, the movement appears to be less from government into the private 
sector, but from the private sector into the government sector: “The most central 
(i.e., the best-connected) organizations in these interorganizational networks are 
also major corporations” (ibid at 740). 
In sum, looking beyond the formal structures, such as ownership or 
regulatory oversight that are commonly used in economics and law to identify 
governance structures serves as an eye opener not only in China, but equally in 
other countries. Elites are prominent in government and business, and in fact 
often link government and business. However, not all elites are formed in a 
similar manner and the dominance of government vs. the private sector for elite 
formation differs across countries. Future research should focus on how these 
structures help shape influence the formal structures that govern finance – not 
only in China, but also in the West.  
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks: HRM and Global Governance 
 
This paper has shown that governance of China’s finances can be explained 
onl incompletely using conventional paradigms that rely on ownership and legal 
or regulatory controls alone. Instead, China’s governance regime relies heavily 
on HRM. The regime evolved and strengthened during the transition from 
complete state control over finance, which lasted until the early 2000s, to a more 
diverse system that allows for more diverse ownership patterns, more players   36
within China’s domestic financial system, and greater opportunities for Chinese 
entities globally. Further diversification, in particular the greater job 
opportunities for financial cadres outside the CCP controlled HRM system might 
undermine the logic of this regime, i.e. control over future career prospects of 
financial cadres and the current governance regime needs to adapt to these 
ongoing changes. The possible direction of such changes can be gleaned from 
emerging patterns of governance employed by Chinese entities that operate 
globally. The relation between CIC with Blackstone and Morgan Stanley may 
serve as an example. CIC holds over 10 percent in ownership stakes in both 
entities – in Blackstone, which is a limited partnership in the form of non-voting 
‘units’, and in Morgan Stanley in the form of preferred stock as well as debt 
instruments. Yet in neither company does CID hold board positions. While 
executive positions were excluded in the original investment agreements, CIC 
had the option to appoint representatives to the board of directors in both 
companies. The choice not to exercise these options could be interpreted to 
suggest that CIC has decided to operate as a purely passive investor. This, 
however, might not capture the whole story. As a 10 percent owners and 
potential future funder, CIC undoubtedly has a ‘voice’ with the management of 
these organizations. Moreover, CIC has recently announced that Blackstone and 
Morgan Stanley have been chosen by CIC to manage hundreds of millions of 
dollars in new global investments. The Wall Street Journal captured this move   37
with the headline “CIC turns to friends”.29 The move to strengthen personal ties 
even as financial gains were still outstanding suggests that CIC invested not 
only, and perhaps not primarily, in financial assets when it invested in these 
firms, but in relational bonds comprising of human capital. That investment 
appears to be paying off handsomely for Blackstone and Morgan Stanley as they 
have gained money management opportunities for CIC’s investments. It might 
also point the way towards a different form of HRM in the global context: one 
that does not rely primarily on controlling future careers, but access to future 
finance and markets. This would be akin to the world of international finance in 
the old days when family empires – from the Medici to the Rothchilds – 
dominated international finance. 
                                                 
29 Rick Carew and Jenny Strasburg, “CIC Turns to Friends: Blackstone and Morgan Stanley”, 31 
July 2009, available at e.wsj.com/article/SB124896400764393841.html.    38
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Table 1: Ownership of China’s Largest Banks 
  Five largest shareholders by stake 
(% of all outstanding shares is given in parenthesis) 
#1 #2  #3  #4  #5 
Agricultural Bank of 
China Limited (as of 
January 2009 when 
ABC completed its 
reorganization and 
incorporated in form of 
stock company under 
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30 The total number of outstanding shares is 253,839,162,009, of which the 76,020,251,269 shares 
are H Shares, and 177,818,910,740 shares are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.) 
31 Li Ka Shing is a famous HK billionaire, wealthy individual.   
32 The total number of outstanding shares is 48,994,383,703, of which the 23,064,468,136 shares are 
H Shares, and 25,929,915,567 are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.) 
33 Out of the 12,974,982,648 shares that MoF owns, all the 9,974,982,648 A Shares are subject to 
Selling Restrictions. 
34 S OE denotes State Owned Enterprise 
35 The total number of outstanding shares is 233,689,084,000, of which the 224,689,084,000 are H 
Shares, and 9,000,000,000 are A Shares (listed at Shanghai Stock Exchange.) 
36 In July 2009, Jianyin (HuiJin’s wholly-owned subsidiary) transferred all of the H Shares it 
originally owned to HuiJin for free, and thus increased HuiJin’s shareholding percentage in CCB 
by 8.85% (i.e., 20,692,250,000 H Shares subject to Selling Restrictions). 
37 Bank of America cannot sell those shares without CCB’s written approval until August 29, 
2011. 
38 The total number of authorized shares is 334,018,850,026, of which the 83,056,501,962 shares are 






   
                                                 
39 The “Selling Restrictions” refer to the restrictions imposed on the shareholders for reselling 
these shares on the market.  These restrictions were imposed as part of the “Share Reform”, 
which was launched in 2005 in China with the purpose of converting the non-tradable state-
owned shares in public companies into tradable shares, though subject to certain selling 
restrictions.  Typically these restrictions impose certain lockup periods.   
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Table 2: CFWC’s Human Resource Management (1998-2003) 
National Financial 
Institutions, from vice-
ministerial level (formally 
appointed by COD) down to 
the deputy bureau chief level 
National commercial 
financial institutions with 
control over senior executives 
and supervisory board 
members 
National commercial 
financial institutions with 
control over senior executives 
only  
PBOC BOC  Minsheng  Bank 
CSRC CCB  Minsheng Securities 
IRC ICBC  Minsheng Life Insurance 
 ABC  Merchants  Bank 
 CDB  Sci-Tech  Securities 
  Minzu  Securities 
  China Import Export Bank  Galaxy Securities 
  4 AMC  Government Securities 
Depository Trust & Clearing 
Co 
  CITIC Group  Chung Mei Trust & 
Investment 
 Everbright  Group   
  Bank of Communications   
 People’s  Insurance   
 China  Life  Insurance   
 China  Reinsurance   
  China Export & Credit 
Insurance 
 
Source: Heilmann (2005).     43
Figure 1: Formal Governance 
   44
Figure 2: HRM -- Concurrent Entity Affiliations  
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Figure 3: HRM -- Previous and Concurrent Entity Affiliations 
   46
Figure 4: Current Personal Affiliations  
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Figure 5: HRM for Global Players 
 
 